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July 8, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: CIA Five Day Orientation Course for Senior Foreign Service Officers - June 16-22

The CIA Orientation Course for selected Foreign Service Officers from the graduating class of the National War College was unanimously regarded by the participating officers as an extremely valuable exercise and an unqualified success. This conclusion is the more interesting when viewed against the almost equally unanimous attitude of scepticism with which the same officers initially accepted the prospect of giving up five precious days of their leave between conclusion of War College and departure for their new posts. They anticipated having to sit through five days of dry, canned lectures dealing in generalities, which they thought could be accomplished in one day.

General Comment

Among the principal reasons why the course, contrary to expectation, was regarded favorably, were the following:

1. The fact that top rather than middle or low-level officials of CIA took the time not only to explain the nature of the Agency's operations but to answer detailed questions.
2. The frankness with which the same CIA officials discussed with the group operational problems of a highly sensitive nature.
3. The obvious sincerity with which the CIA officials discussed both the necessity and desire to work closely with and receive the sympathetic support of the Foreign Service.
4. The time, care for detail and seriousness which had obviously been given by the Agency in preparation of the course.
5. Aside from the foregoing factors, which were important in creating proper atmosphere, it was the substantive side of the course which really paid dividends in the opinion of the participants.

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All of the participants had had some contact with CIA representatives and operations at posts abroad. None of us had but the vaguest sort of conception of the exact charter of CIA, the scope and variety of its responsibilities, the manner and competence with which it attempted to discharge these responsibilities, or the mechanism for acquiring policy guidance from the Department and the seriousness with which the Agency regarded the absolute necessity for receiving such guidance.

It is not an exaggeration to state that the participants departed from the course with a newly-won and very high regard for the high calibre of the responsible operational officers of CIA. Most of the participating officers went into the course with serious reservations on various aspects of CIA's operation, based on their past limited experience with one or another isolated phase of CIA operations. They left with the conviction that the Agency had developed an impressive degree of professional competence and a most reassuring sense of responsibility and awareness that its operations must be in support of and not in conflict with the overall and specific foreign policy objectives of the United States. It was with regard to these last two basic factors that the participating officers, (and I believe this is true of most Foreign Service Officers who have not had recent and intimate association with CIA operations) entertained genuine scepticism. The fact that this scepticism was dispelled, which I am confident to have been the case, speaks for itself as full justification for having carried through this exercise and repeating it on a continuous and broad as possible basis.

Specific Comment

1. With regard to the content of the course it was the consensus of opinion that the subject of "Couriers, Pouches and Shipment of Material" could be eliminated in future courses. In place of this it was considered worthwhile devoting more time to covering the operations of the IO Division, which for some reason was not included in the program. This could be done by indicating the types of organizations sponsored by IO without necessarily mentioning the names of the organizations.

2. The group was very impressed with the nature and dissemination of the intelligence product of CIA as described by Mr. Amory. In this connection most members of the group expressed their ignorance of the existence of much of the printed and disseminated intelligence product of CIA. It was felt that it would be most worthwhile if the material were made more widely available both in the Department and in the field.


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4. Although there was not time to discuss this particular factor during the course, the group believed that it would be helpful if in a future course of this nature the Agency could explain just how it goes about utilizing available assets at a given post for the three separate functions of intelligence, paramilitary and psychological. Are the assets divided up between the three, are they interchangeable, etc.?

Charles E. Hulick, Jr.
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